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CHAPTER IO 
LOCKOUTS, PROTESTS, AND SCABS 
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 
LOS ANGELES HERALD EXAMINER STRIKE 
'Bonnie 'Brennen 
HE LOS ANGELES HERALD EXAMINER STRIKE, 1967-
1977, offers important insights into the impact of insti-
tutional power on the development of labor and news 
work in American journalism. The decade-long strike 
had devastating economic consequences for both the 
newspaper and the unions. According to Robert J. Danzig, Hearst 
Corporation Vice President in the 1980s, although the unions and the 
newspaper finally reconciled, the strike "crippled labor relations and 
caused an exodus of advertisers and subscribers" (quoted in Mathews 
& Farhi 1989, E-3). As a result of the strike, the Los Angeles Herald 
Examiner eventually ceased publication and the viability of the Los 
Angeles Newspaper Guild was severely undermined. Although the 
"facts" of the labor conflict are well known, this essay addresses issues 
of identity, work, and economics in the power struggle between Los 
Angeles Newspaper Guild members and Hearst management. Spe-
cifically, this critical cultural study assesses the Guild-based publicity 
efforts as well as the local and national press coverage of the strike 
in an effort to understand the political and social implications of this 
labor struggle. It also attempts to explain publisher George R. Hearst's 
potential motives for refusing to negotiate with the unions and pro-
longing a strike that eventually destroyed his newspaper. 
Critical communication studies offer historically grounded and po-
litically informed examinations of culturally situated media practices 
that may expose power relations in the communication process and 
provide alternative readings of the relationship between media and 
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society (H ardt 2001). Historically based critical cultural analyses go 
beyond considerations of catastrophe, crisis, domination, and oppres~ 
sion to also consider regenerative processes, oppositional strategies, 
and challenges to dominant ideological positions. As Raymond Wil~ 
Iiams (1989, 322) explains,"It's the infinite resilience, even deviousness, 
with which people have managed to persist in profoundly unfavorable 
conditions, and the striking diversity of the beliefs in which they've 
expressed their autonomy:' Understanding the political ramifications 
of history, critical cultural assessments of labor relations consider the 
"often t roubled" (Garnham 2000, 33) relationships between the cul~ 
rural and economic realms within organizations and professions. 
During the past decade critical scholars h ave urged a more interdis ~ 
ciplinary approach to media studies, linking cultural considerations 
directly to the political economic realm. The political economy of 
communication examines relationships between media ownership, 
advertising, and government policies, particularly as they influence 
media practices and content (McChesney 2000). Showcasing theo~ 
retical connections between cultural studies and political economy, 
Nicholas Garnham (1995, 7 1) maintains that because in capitalist 
societies, "waged labor and commodity exchange constitute people's 
necessary and unavoidable conditions of existence," these elements 
must be included in any analysis of cultural pract ices. While cultural 
studies theorists remain concerned with the reductionist potential of 
political economy, Lawrence Grossberg (1995, 79) notes that econom~ 
ic practices may even help to shape the cultural agenda, albeit "always 
and only in part:' Eileen Meehan (1999, 162) suggests that a dialogue 
between cultural studies and political economy is "essential" to critique 
the complex "relationships among corporations, audiences, makers, 
and regulators:· 
Pointing to Hanna H ardt's 1990 study of newsworkers, technology, 
and journalism history as an example, Mosco (1996) finds that recent 
studies of newsroom labor are one contemporary area of research that 
attempts to reconcile political economic concerns wi th critical cultural 
studies. This essay responds to Meehan's interdisciplinary call by in ~ 
regrating central concerns of political economy into a critical cultural 
analysis. 
This historical study of the Los Angeles Herald Examiner strike 
draws on government documents on antitrust and monopoly, as well 
as hearings regarding the Failing Newspaper Act, which considered 
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joint operating agreements including "price fixing, profit pooling and 
market allocation" (Barwis 1989, 27) for at risk newspapers. It uses 
strike#related materials from the Los Angeles Newspaper Guild col, 
lection at the Los Angeles Urban Archives Center; Los Angeles Herald 
Examiner labor conflict files from the Freedom of Information Center 
at the Missouri School of Journalism; and two telephone interviews 
with Charles Dale, an International Representative of the N ewspaper 
Guild who served as co#director of the strike. 
CONSTRUCTING A COL LECTIVE IDENTITY 
The strike began on December 15, 1967 when approximately 1,100 
members of the Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local69 walked out 
of the Los Angeles Herald Examiner. At the time of the labor conflict, 
the Guild negotiated for all Herald Examiner newsroom, circulation, 
and business employees ("Guild strike idles 1900" 1967). Guild mem, 
hers had asked for a $25.20 a week salary increase for reporters, pho, 
tographers, and copy editors, achieved over a two,year period, to bring 
them in line with their colleagues on the Los Angeles Times and the 
Long Beach Independent Press-Telegram. At the time of the strike, full 
time professional Guild reporters, known as journeymen, with four 
to five years experience earned a minimum of $174.50 a week at the 
Herald Examiner. Comparable wages on the city's non,union morning 
newspaper, the Los Angeles Times, were $208 a week ("Where do we 
stand" 1967). Negotiations had broken down after Herald Examiner 
management had offered Guild members a $13 weekly increase over a 
two-year period (Stone 1968). 
In support of the Guild, members of the International Association 
of Machinists, Local 94 also walked out of the Herald Examiner that 
morning. That afternoon members of the International Typographical 
Unions, Printers Local 174 and Mailers Local 9 were locked out by 
management after they refused to do editorial work such as gathering 
wire copy and running stories from the news office to the back#shop 
print facilities. Later that day Web Pressmen, Locall8, Stereotypers, 
Local 58, and Paper Handlers, Local 3 were forced out of the newspa, 
per"under threat of arrest" ("Strike fact sheet" 1968, 1). In sympathy, 
Building Services Employees, Local 399, Teamsters General Ware, 
housemen, Local 598, Photoengravers, Local262, and News Vendors, 
Local 75,A stopped working. In total approximately 2,000 union 
members were affected by the labor conflict. 
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A few months before the strike began, the Los Angeles Newspa~ 
per Guild Bulletin evaluated minimum weekly pay rates for news~ 
paper reporters and photographers in urban newsgathering centers 
guaranteed in Guild contracts. It found that Guild reporters in Los 
Angeles received the lowest contract pay. For example, experienced 
Guild reporters in St. Louis and San Francisco earned at least $200 a 
week while Herald Examiner and Independent Press-Telegram reporters 
earned $174.50 each week ("Where do we stand" 1967).1hat fall, the 
Long Beach Independent Press-Telegram Guild unit successfully negoti-
ated a new contract that would bring reporters' salaries up to $200 a 
week within two years. 
In negotiating sessions held before the strike, Herald Examiner man~ 
agement maintained that it was "economically impossible" to match the 
salaries and benefits of those recently negotiated at the other Guild 
newspaper, the Long Beach Independent Press-Telegram. In response, 
Robert). Rupert (1967), Chief Negotiator of the Los Angeles News~ 
paper Guild, urged Hearst to provide the Guild with evidence that 
the Herald Examiner was losing money. Hearst management did not 
respond. In the early weeks of the strike, Hearst negotiators changed 
their position regarding the salary dispute and said that while the 
newspaper could afford the new wage proposals, they "did not see fit to 
do so" ("No heart in Hearst position" 1968, 1). 
Throughout the decade~long labor conflict, the Los Angeles News· 
paper Guild organized a variety of public relations activities and uti~ 
lized several publication venues to keep strikers informed and to pub~ 
licize and promote their views on the progress of the strike. More than 
1,400 daily editions of the newsletter On the Line reported on labor 
activities during the first four years of the Herald Examiner strike. The 
Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Bulletin regularly covered strike~ relat~ 
ed issues and events as did the official publication of the Los Angeles 
County AFL~CIO unions, the Los Angeles Citizen. In addition, signifi~ 
cant labor related news and opinion were announced in press releases 
sent to local, regional, and national media outlets throughout the ten 
years. 
Strike~related promotional activities and news coverage focused on 
three major intertwined issues: the economic aspects of the strike, the 
use of professional strikebreakers to crush the unions, and H earst's 
refusal to negotiate with labor. Consistent with Douglas Kellner's 
(1995) suggestion that in modernity group or individual identity is 
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self~reflexive and changeable, Guild strike strategies may be seen to 
have also aided in the development of a collective identity as workers. 
One economics~based strategy of the Guild was to try to persuade 
local companies to stop advertising in the Herald Examiner during 
.the labor conflict. Letters were sent to major advertisers and mem~ 
bers talked with businesses about canceling their advertising. Rupert 
(1968) maintained that advertisers held the key to the strike: "They 
are the life line of the newspaper. Without them, Hearst could not 
fur ther pursue his union~busting campaign." Urging major advertisers 
to support the labor boycott, Rupert rejected the use of violence or 
other illegal actions by union members, yet he warned that the Guild 
would take every legal action possible to disrupt businesses that failed 
to support the strike. 
More than three years into the strike the Guild continued to encour~ 
age businesses not to buy advertising during the strike and consumers 
not to purchase products from companies that continued to advert ise 
in the Herald Examiner. For example, the January 27, 1970 issue of 
the Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Bulletin urged workers not to buy 
Coors, Seagrams, or California grapes because the companies still ad~ 
vertised in the Herald Examiner. In an effort to sway major advertised 
continued support of the newspaper, Guild members picketed H erald 
Examiner advertisers and held large demonstrations at major local re~ 
railers. While many businesses continued to advertise in the Herald 
Examiner, demonstrations and related activities continued to increase 
public awareness of the strike and helped to bring Guild members to~ 
gether and re~energize them for the extended strike. 
In addition to daily picket lines at the Herald Examiner, Guild crews 
went door to door, discussing the strike with residents and asking 
them to cancel their subscriptions to the Herald Examiner during the 
dispute. This strategy not only hurt the newspaper's circulation but it 
also further increased community awareness of the issues involved in 
the strike. Decreases in circulation and advertising lineage reductions 
were regularly reported in pro~Guild publications as evidence of la~ 
bor's progress in the strike. Hearst's discontinuation of the newspaper 
bowling tournament and the closing of the Herald Examiner library 
were showcased as further evidence of the strike's economic damage to 
the newspaper (Dale and Pattison, n.d.). 
Such strategies had devastating consequences for the Herald Ex~ 
aminer's circulation and revenue figures. Audit Bureau figures for 
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September 30, 1967 ranked the Los Angeles Herald Examiner as the 
largest circulation daily afternoon newspaper in the United States, 
with a Monday through Friday average of731,473 ("Guild strike idles 
1900" 1967). Six weeks into the strike, Herald Examiner daily circula~ 
tion dropped 28 percent to about 450,000. Circulation continued to 
decrease throughout the strike ("No apparent end seen" 1968). Ad~ 
vertising revenue declined sharply and Time magazine estimated that 
after one year the strike had cost the Herald Examiner $15 million in 
advertising sales revenues alone ("Defeat of the strikers" 1968). 
Charles Dale, an International Representative of the Newspaper 
Guild, was sent by labor leaders to Los Angeles to work with the other 
unions on the strike. As co~director of the Herald Examiner strike, 
Dale focused on making strike related activities as effective as pos~ 
sible. He oversaw the economic aspects of the conHict, made sure that 
strike benefits were paid and all money was spent wisely, and worked 
to bring the strike to a positive conclusion. According to Dale, to keep 
strikers motivated during the lengthy conHict, the Guild held many 
meetings and organized numerous events for the striking workers, in~ 
eluding an annual Thanksgiving food drive. As the strike dragged on 
Guild members became discouraged. Nonetheless, Dale said, the low 
pay and old, outdated equipment at the newspaper motivated union 
members. Most remained determined to negotiate a fair contract 
(Dale 2002, pers. comm., February 21 and 26). 
Appeals for donations to help fund the strike frequently appeared 
in pro~labor publications. In March 1969, fifteen labor organizations 
in Southern California pledged $250,000 for a radio, newspaper, and 
television advertising campaign to encourage the public to boycott 
companies who continued to advertise in the Herald Examiner (Joint 
Council ofTeamsters 1969). Although unions throughout the coun~ 
try and in Canada helped out financially, by August 1971 the Los An~ 
geles Newspaper Guild had borrowed $100,000 from the AFL~CIO 
because costs associated with the Herald Examiner strike had reached 
five million dollars. 
SHOWCASING SCAB LABOR 
The most strident rhetoric found in Guild strike materials focused on 
the Herald Examiner's use of professional strikebreakers, also known 
as scabs. Author Jack London coined the term "scab" in 1903 to de~ 
scribe a professional strikebreaker who readily works in the place of 
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a striking employee and refuses to join or support the actions of la~ 
bor. London (1953, 1) insisted that "the modern strikebreaker sells 
his birthright, his country, his wife, children and his fellowmen, for an 
unfilled promise from his employer, trust or corporation:· From ala~ 
bor perspective, the use of professional strikebreakers undermines the 
coLlective bargaining process, since when scab labor is used, employers 
are trying to "bust" the unions, reject contract negotiations, and op~ 
erate an open shop without union influence. During the Los Angeles 
Herald Examiner strike, Hearst used at least 200 professional strike~ 
breakers "imported" from other cities and states. The Guild judged 
this a betrayal of all working people and condemned it as unethical 
and amoral. The Guild Bulletin and On the Line frequently referred to 
professional strikebreakers as "parasites;"'criminals;' and "mercenaries" 
with no redeeming value. Specific information on professional strike~ 
breakers working for the Herald Examiner was repeatedly included 
in pro~Guild publications. For example, the January 1968 edition of 
Strike Lockout Extra prominently displayed photographs of strike~ 
breakers and identified them not only by skill areas but also by name, 
background, criminal record, and past strikebreaking activities. 
Twelve days into the strike, AFL~CIO Leader Thomas L. Pitts 
charged that Hearst's use of professional strikebreakers was part of 
a concerted effort to destroy collective bargaining at the Herald Ex, 
aminer and ultimately "crush the unions" (Peevey 1967). An undated 
editorial cartoon in The Guild Bulletin by "Strobel" titled "A Killer on 
the Loose!" illustrated labor's concern about "George R. Hearst's Anti~ 
Union Drive;' with huge feet smashing free collective bargaining in 
America, and destroying employees' rights, union shops, decent wages, 
working conditions, and the gains of labor during the last 30 years. 
Strike leaders also maintained that professional strikebreakers 
were used to destabilize the working class community of Los Angeles 
("Dynamics of aggression" 1968). With nearly 2,000 employees out of 
work, the economic and social well being of the community was chal~ 
lenged by "transient mercenaries" who collected excessive wages and 
then moved on without contributing anything to the community. La~ 
bor leaders maintained that professional strikebreakers' lack of respect 
for union work generally escalated into a total lack of respect for the 
community as a whole ("Community is loser" 1968, 4 ). 
Executive Secretary of the Los Angeles County Federation of La~ 
bor Sigmund Arywitz (1968a) maintained that Hearst management 
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had been preparing for a strike for at least one month before it began. 
Newsprint, cots, and food were stockpiled at the plant, a chain link 
wire fence was installed around part of the building, and arrangements 
were made with the Western Newspaper Industrial Relations Bureau, 
a company chat specialized in providing newspapers with non~union 
labor, to hire professional strikebreakers. Three weeks into the strike, 
H earst negotiators announced that professional strikebreakers hired 
at the beginning of the strike would become permanent employees and 
would have "super-seniority" over striking workers regardless of any 
final agreement reached. Finding Hearst's actions "wholly unaccept~ 
able, immoral and a deterrent to peace" ("Labor calls Hearst boycott" 
1968, A~3), Arywitz (1968b) insisted that such decisions made nego~ 
tiations impossible. He said that until the Herald Examiner dismissed 
all professional strikebreakers and began negotiating with the unions, 
they must be considered the enemy of labor. In response to Hearst's 
actions, 2,000 union members participated in an anri~srrikebreaker 
march from the Herald Examiner to Los Angeles City Hall ("Labor 
socks Hearse;' 1968). The Los Angeles County Federation of Labor 
called for a nationwide boycott of all Hearst enterprises. People were 
urged not to purchase any Hearst newspapers, magazines, or Avon 
Pocket Books and to cancel subscriptions to Hearst publications. 
Hearst's unwillingness to negotiate continued throughout the 
strike. Los Angeles Mayor Sam Yorcy, members of the Los Angeles 
City Council, and ten prominent Jewish and Protestant clergy urged 
Hearst to negotiate with the unions; however, he refused ("Strike fact 
sheer;' 1968). Eight months into the strike~lockout, Guild negotiators 
said they were willing to work with any arbitrator chosen by the Her-
ald Examiner. Hearst management replied: 
We will not turn the management of this paper over to an outsider. 
We are not going co give any outsider the authority co make deci-
sions regarding the operation of this paper. We will not agree co 
arbitrate any of the outstanding issues we have in dispute with rhe 
Guild. (Rupert & Dale 1968, 1) 
Nearly four years into the strike, the Los Angeles Newspaper Guild 
and the other unions involved in the Herald Examiner srrike~lockour 
volunteered to comply with President Richard Nixon's call for a three~ 
month end to all labor conflicts. In exchange for ending the strike, 
union members asked Hearst to end his lockout and immediately 
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rehire all union members who were still available to work. Hearst re, 
fused to agree with their terms (Abraham 1971). Although Hearst's 
unwillingness to deal with the unions frustrated negotiators, it rein, 
forced the union's zeal for gaining an equitable contract and helped to 
keep strikers motivated as to the righteousness of their cause, again 
reinforcing a collective identity among Guild members as part of the 
labor movement. 
PRESS COVERAGE OF THE STRIKE 
Over the ten years, an extensive amount of pro,Guild strike informa, 
cion and publicity was produced. However, Dale explained that the 
anti,labor sentiment in Los Angeles made getting other newspapers 
interested in covering the Herald Examiner strike difficult (Dale 2002, 
pers. comm.). Dale's comments regarding an anti,labor environment 
are supported by research into the American labor movement during 
the twentieth century. Robert McChesney (1999, 298) finds that in 
mainstream media Labor coverage is limited to stories about the nega, 
tive or violent aspects of strikes. "If one read only the commercial me, 
dia, it would be difficult to determine what on earth good was served 
by having labor unions at all:' As early as the 1940s and 1950s"union, 
ists charged that it was impossible to find unbiased coverage of labor 
issues in the daily press" (Fones, Wolf & Fones, Wolf 1995, 48). An as, 
sessment of more than 50 articles on the Los Angeles Herald Examiner 
strike published in local and national newspapers, collected in the Los 
Angeles Urban Archives and the Freedom of Information Center, also 
supports Dale's charges. From the 1950s through the 1990s the Mis, 
souri Freedom of Information Center clipped all newspaper articles 
available on freedom of expression, including the Los Angeles Herald 
Examiner strike. A pro,labor perspective is virtually absent from the 
reportage of the Herald Examiner strike. Consistent with McChesney, 
the strike coverage in local and national newspapers, Time newsmaga, 
zine, and the trade publication Editor and Publisher, focused on the 
violence of the strike and the damage the unions were inflicting on the 
newspaper. 
In most cases a pro-management perspective was framed through 
word choice and an emphasis on negative consequences of the strike 
for H earst management. Headlines such as "Mob invades Walnut 
Creek, attacks Times" (1968), "Strike violence at L.A. paper" (1968), 
and "H erald strike throng pays city hall visit" (Bernstein 1968a) 
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illustrate how the strikers' actions were cast in a negative light. The 
coverage frequently compared the strikers to an unruly mob. For ex-
ample, supporters of the strike were referred to as a "massive throng" 
of demonstrators who "demanded" an audience with the Mayor (Bern-
stein 1968a, 1). When labor picketed other Hearst properties the Los 
Angeles Times reported that picketers were participating in an "illegal 
secondary boycott" (Bernstein 1968b, 1). In contrast, Hearst was por-
trayed as a courageous individual battling with the evil unions. Time 
magazine maintained that the grandson of William Randolph dis-
played "determination rarely displayed these days by a publisher con-
fronted with a strike" ("Frustrating the unions" 1968, 72). The Wall 
Street Journal showcased Hearst's ability to keep publishing the news-
paper during the strike and several newspaper articles lauded Hearst 
for working in the newsroom and pressroom, answering the phone 
and even composing type. "Powerful" support from the non-union Los 
Angeles Times and Mayor Yorty was showcased to illustrate the righ-
teousness of Hearst's stance. Yorry was quoted as saying, "I think the 
unions should get wise to themselves. They're putting the newspapers 
out of business" ("Defeat of the strikers" 1968, 48). Financial costs 
associated with the strike were used to reinforce the need to fight the 
unions; no articles mentioned the circulation and advertising losses to 
illustrate public support of strikers. 
The consequences of professional strikebreakers were downplayed in 
most of the coverage. The term "professional strikebreaker" was rarely 
used; instead scabs were referred to as "non-union personnel." To de-
emphasize the use of professional strikebreakers, reporters explained 
how H earst managers worked in the newsroom to augment the use of 
wire-service copy and syndicated columns from other H earst writers. 
T ime magazine reported that during the strike jurisdictional disputes 
ceased, because non-union labor and management worked together 
wherever they were needed. The article noted approvingly chat "even 
reporters are called on to run copy and dirty their hands in the back-
shop" ("Frustrating the unions" 1968, 72). 
Violence was a significant aspect of the strike coverage in the press. 
During the strike Hearst management was quick to define any issues 
or problems as violent pro-labor actions. The Herald Examiner distrib-
uted flyers and ran display advertisements offering a reward for evi-
dence resulting in the arrest and conviction "of any person, or persons, 
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damaging the property of any Herald,Examiner advertiser through 
strike, related criminal activity" ("H earst reward" 1970). 
Newspapers showcased Hearst's accusations in strike,related cover, 
age, even when the charges were unfounded. Ten days after the strike 
began the Los Angeles Thnes reported chat the Herald Examiner was 
offering a $5,000 reward for information on shots fired at a newspaper 
delivery truck. The Times quoted Herald management as saying that 
since the strike began there had been repeated incidents and threats 
of violence against newspaper dealers and carrier boys and sabotage at 
the newspaper's offices. While the front,page article focused on strike, 
related violence, it mentioned that the Los Angeles County Sheriff's 
office had found no bullet holes or other evidence to indicate a shoot, 
ing (Reich 1967). Also within days of the strike's onset, Editor and 
Publisher reported that union members had sabotaged the Herald Ex, 
aminer. Hearst management had ch arged that glue was poured onto 
the newsprint conveyor belts, ink tanks were emptied onto the press, 
room floor, and composing room type and materials were destroyed 
("Guild strike idles 1900;' 1967). Similarly, Time magazine described 
the"cold blooded murder" of a non,union printer as the worst of some 
150 strike,related violent actions. While the newsmagazine admitted 
that police had not tied the crime to the unions, the article showcased 
Herald Examiner opinion that blamed the shooting on the strikers 
("Frustrating the unions;' 1968, p. 72). Ultimately, no charges were 
ever filed against any union members connected with the Herald Ex, 
aminer strike. 
Lack of evidence was also apparent in the Des Moines Register report 
that a January 1968 pro,labor demonstration "erupted into violence" 
when windows were broken with rocks and sticks. The newspaper ar, 
tide added that a television cameraman was "attacked" but sustained 
no injury. Missing from the news story was any estimation of the num, 
hers of protestors, the extent of the violence, or the cost of the dam, 
age. Nor did the article include any sources to support the accusations 
("Strike violence at L.A. paper" 1968, 1). No follow,up coverage of the 
demonstration was found in the archived articles. 
Reporters connected other arguably unconnected newspaper indus, 
try violence to the Los Angeles Herald Examiner strike. For example, 
when a Large group of men damaged machinery at the Walnut Creek 
printing plant used to publish the Contra Costa Times and the Concord 
Transcript, news reports blamed union sympathizers for the damage. 
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Although no evidence was included to support such an accusation, ar-
ticles quoted owner/ publisher Dean Lesher as saying that he did not 
know why union sympathizers harmed his plant because his news-
papers had "no connection" with strike. Lesher noted char the Herald 
Examiner had hired some of his employees, bur he maintained that 
the workers left"without consent" ("Printing shop wrecked" 1968, 8). 
While much of the coverage included some mention of the union 
perspective, if only ro counter Hearst's charges, some Editor and Pub-
lisher articles were openly and blatantly anti-labor. For example, an E 
& P article published one month after the strike began emphasized 
the efforts of labor to try to close down Hearst's newspapers. Calling 
picket lines at the Los Angeles Herald Examiner and at H earst-owned 
newspaper the San Francisco Examiner "strong-arm" techniques that 
"turn collective bargaining into a farce" (Brown 1968, 64), E & Purged 
Guild members to be reasonable and equitable. No mention whatso-
ever of the Guild's position appeared in the E & P article. Hearst's 
use of professional strikebreakers and his unwillingness to participate 
in collective bargaining were omitted from rhe coverage as were wage 
inequities. 
Overall, the U.S. press showcased a pro-management perspective on 
the strike, dismissing union charges and accusations as insignificant. 
None of the news articles presented both sides of the labor conflict 
fairly, much less showcased a pro-labor position. Even labor's charge 
that Hearst would not negotiate was downplayed and challenged as 
merely a "claim" by union members ("Frustrating the unions" 1968, 
72). None of the articles archived at Missouri questioned Hearst's 
determination that union members were responsible for all strike-
related violence. No articles considered the possibility that police and/ 
or professional strikebreakers might be involved in some of the vio-
lence. In fact, Dale said that he met often with the Los Angeles Police 
Department to complain about brutality on the picket lines, but he 
found police were clearly pro-management (Dale 2002, pers. comm.). 
In at least one case, a police officer framed a strike leader for destroy-
ing newspaper delivery boxes and threw him in jail for ten days. Dale 
noted that the professional strikebreakers often assaulted the strik-
ers. The strikebreakers walked through rhe picket lines with long neck 
soda bottles and hit the picketers with them. They also injured strikers 
with filed down printing tools. 
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HEARST S UNWILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE 
Why did George Hearst refuse to negotiate with the unions and allow 
the strike eventually to destroy his newspaper~ A definitive answer is 
impossible, given that Hearst himself has remained mute on this topic. 
He never commented publicly on the strike and repeated requests for 
an interview have been denied. 1 No Herald Examiner archive exists. 
As California Business reporter Dan Goodgame (1987, 46) suggest, 
ed, as a private corporation, "the Hearses don't have to tell anybody 
anything about their business, and generally they don't:' The Hearst 
corporate web site offers a brief history of the corporation and a time, 
line that begins on March 4, 1887 when William Randolph Hearst 
became proprietor of the San Francisco Examiner. Although the vast 
majority of acquisitions are included here, the site never mentions the 
Los Angeles Herald Examiner (or any ocher Hearst,owned Los Ange, 
les papers), although at one time it was the largest circulation after, 
noon newspaper in the United States. 
While the Hearst corporation may have erased the Herald Examiner 
from its h istory, some strong evidence remains that provides clues as 
to Hearst's motivation for his actions during the strike. Early in his ca, 
reer William Randolph Hearst was not actively opposed to the labor 
movement. Ironically, the Los Angeles Examiner began publication in 
1903 after labor activists encouraged Hearst to start a union newspa, 
per in Los Angeles to compete with the non,tmion Los Angeles Times 
(North 2003). Hearst agreed and in November 1903 the Los Angeles 
Herald Examiner began publication. 
Initially, Hearst seemed to respect the role of labor and he negoti, 
ated equitable contracts with craft and trade unions. However, Hearst 
was actively opposed to the American Newspaper Guild from its in, 
ception in 1933. Envisioning reporters as romantic figures, Hearst felt 
that the Guild would undermine editorial policies and could ultimate, 
ly compromise the integrity of journalism (Lee 1937). He ordered 
his editors and publishers actively to oppose the Guild. Newsroom 
employees were warned not co join the Guild; those who disobeyed 
were reprimanded and even fired (Carlisle 1969). In 1934, the firing 
1 This author made numerous attempts by letter, email and telephone to 
contact George H earst or any H earst managers willing to comment on the 
Herald Examiner strike. To date, no one connected with the Hearst organi, 
zation has been willing co comment. 
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of the respected San Francisco Examiner editorial writer Louis Burgess 
for union activities exemplified Hearst's anti,Guild policy. During the 
development of the American Newspaper Guild, H earst refused to 
negotiate with any of the local Guilds; when the Milwaukee News went 
on strike, H earst vowed to spend as much money as necessary to de, 
feat the Guild. After a tentative agreement had been reached between 
editorial workers and the newspaper, H. L. Bitner, General Manager 
of Hearst newspapers, informed Milwaukee Guild members, "The 
Hearst management will not enter into any agreement written or ver-
bal that recognizes the Guild" (quoted in Leah 1970, 250). For H ey-
wood Broun (1936), the American Newspaper Guild's first president, 
Hearst's strident non, recognition of the Guild became a unifying 
force among editorial workers. Initially the Guild was organized as 
a semi-professional organization that worked with publishers to rep, 
resent the economic and professional needs of editorial workers. As 
publisher resistance and non-recognition escalated, the Guild became 
a union committed to collective bargaining. 2 
George H earst's actions during the Herald Examiner strike solidified 
an anti,Guild bias first established by his grandfather William Ran, 
dolph H earst. During the twentieth century the Los Angeles News, 
paper Guild and Hearst management had maintained a contentious 
relationship. Strikes occurred in the late 1930s and again in 1946. 
The Guild held a one,day strike in November 1965 after a contract 
deadline passed without resolution. Apparently shocked by the strike, 
George H earst settled with the Guild within hours but "vowed that 
he would oust the unions" ("History of the Herald Examiner strike" 
n.d.). The November 1965 strike is generally considered the precursor 
of the 1967-1977 Herald Examiner strike. Dale suspects that Hearst 
wanted to destroy the unions as a way to keep the Herald Examiner 
economically competitive with the non,union Los Angeles Times (Dale 
2002, pers. comm.). While this is an interesting explanation, it does 
not fully explain Hearst's actions because at that time employees at 
the Times were paid considerably higher wages than workers on the 
Herald Examiner. Although the problems between the Hearst or, 
ganization and the Guild were at least in part historically situated, 
H earst's actions probably were also a conscious effort to weaken the 
2 For further discussion on the development of a union perspective in the 
American Newspaper Guild, see Brennen (2004). 
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Guild specifically because it represented the most vocal opposition 
to the development of monopolistic practices in the newspaper busi-
ness. Over the years, the American Newspaper Guild repeatedly ques-
tioned the growth of newspaper chain ownership, single newspaper 
communities, and local media monopolies. Concerned with the influ-
ence of newspaper concentration on the overall economic well-being 
of communities, the Guild asserted that newspaper trends toward 
monopolization eliminated the diversity of informacion, opinion, and 
news sources that were essential to a democratic society (The Failing 
Newspaper Act 1968a). 
MEDIA CONGLOMERATION & MONOPOLIZATION 
By the 1960s, single ownership or combination newspaper monopo-
lies existed in most U.S. cities (Arywitz 1968a). In 1955 chains con-
trolled about 28 percent of the daily newspapers in the U.S.; ten years 
later they controlled 43 percent of daily newspapers (Failing Newspa-
per Act 1968a). In 1962 only 55 U.S. cities still had competing daily 
newspapers, whereas 552 cities had competing daily newspapers in 
1920. According to William Randolph H earst,Jr.,"when monopoly is 
substituted for two formerly competitive papers, the profit is two and 
a half times the total profit under independent operation of the two 
papers" ("Growth of monopoly and concentrated ownership" 1963, 
1291). 
Interestingly, the creation of the Herald Examiner was the result of 
a combination newspaper monopoly in Los Angeles. Until January 
1962, four newspapers operated in Los Angeles. The Hearst-owned 
Herald and the Chandler-owned Times were morning papers. Hearst's 
Herald-Express and Chandler's Mirror were afternoon newspapers. 
Cross-ownership agreements arranged in 1962 between Hearst and 
Chandler consolidated the Examiner and the Herald-Express and dis-
continued the Mirror. These actions resulted in one morning newspa-
per, the Los Angeles Times, and one afternoon paper, the Los Angeles 
Herald Examiner. 
During House of Representatives hearings on news media concen-
tration of ownership, Hearst General Manager G.O. Markuson said 
that the Hearst and Chandler actions in Los Angeles were undertaken 
because the Los Angeles area "could not profitably support four met-
ropolitan papers" (Failing Newspaper Act 1968a, 212). Markuson 
maintained that some of the newspapers were consolidated because 
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they were losing money. Yet in hearings before the judiciary subcom~ 
mittee of antitrust and monopoly, Executive Secretary of the New 
York Newspaper Guild Thomas Murphy attributed the Los Angeles 
situation to corporations creating a monopoly rather than encourag~ 
ing the "free flow of news as a competitive press" (Failing Newspaper 
Act 1968b, 2677). Murphy noted that the Los Angeles newspapers 
had been profitable before the consolidations. Doubting the claim 
that newspapers were losing money, he said that for many years the 
Los Angeles papers had been profitable but that profits had been 
drained off to subsidize other corporate ventures. Further doubt 
about Hearst's consolidations came from Samuel Shulman of the 
General Accounting Office. In 1963, Shulman testified to a House an~ 
titrust subcommittee on newspaper business practices and ownership 
trends that "more realistic bookkeeping" would have changed Hearst's 
claimed $2,037,000 five~year loss on the Los Angeles Examiner into a 
$6,124,000 profit (Failing Newspaper Act 1968a, 209). 
In a concerted effort to halt the newspaper industry's trend toward 
monopolization, in 1959 the Guild asked the Justice Department 
to investigate possible antitrust violations in a rumored newspaper 
merger between Scripps~ Howard and Hearst in New York City. In the 
previous eighteen months Hearst and Scripps~ Howard newspapers in 
San Francisco had merged and Scripps~Howard's United Press had 
acquired Hearst's International News Service. The Guild noted that 
before each of these business transactions, the newspapers had public~ 
ly denied plans for any merger. This time the Guild wanted the Justice 
Department to consider potential antitrust violations before a merger 
was completed. In response, H earst sued the American Newspaper 
Guild for spreading unfounded rumors regarding a new Hearst and 
Scripps~Howard merger. William]. Farson, Executive Vice President 
of the Guild, said that the purpose of Hearst's lawsuit was to divert 
public attention from the justice Department's recent scrutiny ofbusi~ 
ness transactions between H earst and Scripps~ Howard ("Comment 
on Hearst suit"1959). The suit was eventually dropped but not be~ 
fore the Guild spent thousands of dollars in legal costs. However, the 
Guild's call for an antitrust inquiry was successful in the short run in 
that it forestalled new mergers between Hearst and Scripps~ Howard. 
The American Newspaper Guild was also a vocal opponent of the 
Failing Newspaper Act because it would accelerate the trend toward 
monopolization and chain ownership of newspapers. The Failing 
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Newspaper Act was originally designed to maintain the diversity of 
editorial voices in a community when at least one newspaper was in se~ 
rious financial straits and no prospective buyer could be found. Under 
the Act, newspapers established joint operating arrangements that al~ 
lowed them to "reduce costs by combining the economic and business 
aspects of their papers' production, while at the same time maintain~ 
ing separate editorial and reportorial staff" (Barwis 1989, 28). Under 
the Act, jointly operating newspapers may fix joint advertising rates 
and pool their profits-actions that the Sherman and Clayton Anti~ 
trust Acts otherwise expressly prohibited. 
At its board meetings and national conventions the Guild repeated~ 
ly raised opposition to the Failing Newspaper Act. State and national 
officers also testified during Senate and House of Representatives 
hearings. During Congressional hearings Thomas Murphy, Executive 
Secretary of the New York Newspaper Guild, maintained that the 
proposed bill violated current antitrust laws and infringed on freedom 
of the press. Murphy said that, if passed, the Failing Newspaper Act: 
would encourage greater monopoly, not only by giving existing pub~ 
Ushers greater freedom to make agreements for producing newspa~ 
pers more cheaply through common production and distribution 
facilities, but most importantly by giving the blessings of law to 
unregulated price and rate fixing and profit~pooling arrangements 
that make it financially impossible for a potential new competitor 
to even consider attempting to enter a market. (Failing Newspaper 
Act 1968b, 2674) 
While other individuals and organizations also testified against the 
Failing Newspaper Act, most of the commentary against the bill came 
from Guild members. In contrast, newspaper owners and publishers 
lobbied Congressional members for the Act and testified that the Act 
would maintain a diversity of voices and actually prevent newspaper 
monopolies. After extended hearings, and a series of legislative com~ 
promises, including a more optimistic sounding name, the Newspaper 
Preservation Act became law on July 24, 1970. Just as the Guild had 
warned, a retrospective assessment of the Newspaper Preservation 
Act (Barwis 1989) found that joint operating agreements had saved 
no newspapers from failure; instead it had increased the profits of sue~ 
cessful newspapers and encouraged monopolistic business practices 
that inhibited freedom of the press. 
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The Guild's vocal opposition to chain ownership and monopoliza~ 
tion and the Justice Department's repeated investigations into antitrust 
violations directly targeted Hearst. Each time Guild members testified 
before Congress, they offered examples from the Hearst Corporation 
to support their concerns regarding monopolization and chain owner~ 
ship. With the lure of huge financial gains tempting Hearst, he may 
have decided that his economic plans for the corporation depended 
on destroying union viability. Certainly the issue of monopolization 
at least partially influenced Hearst's decisions in the Herald Examiner 
strike. 
A STORY OF FAILURE 
A critical assessment of the Los Angeles Herald Examiner strike show~ 
cases strategies of opposition, challenge, and resistance to the domi~ 
nant ideological power structure. It illustrates the formation of a col~ 
lective identity as well as the power struggles between the unions and 
Hearst. However, the Herald Examiner strike is also a story of fail~ 
ure. Throughout the decade~long strike, Herald Examiner advertising 
revenue and circulation dwindled. In the decade after the strike, the 
newspaper was unable to rebuild its circulation and advertising base. 
In 1989 when the Hearst Corporation attempted to find a buyer for 
the newspaper, its circulation had fallen to 242,000. Unable to sell the 
newspaper, the Herald Examiner ceased publication on November 2, 
1989. Meanwhile, the viability of the Newspaper Guild and the other 
unions involved in the labor conflict was severely undermined, because 
they were unable to negotiate a settlement. In 1976 a series of elec~ 
tions decertified all of the original unions involved in the strike and 
created a new union, the International Printing and Graphic Commu~ 
nications Union, which immediately began negotiations with Hearst. 
Interestingly, the new union included striking workers who had not 
found other jobs and non~union employees who currently worked for 
the newspaper. Eight months later, in March 1977, the International 
Printing and Graphic Communications Union successfully negotiated 
a new three~year contract for Los Angeles H erald Examiner employees 
("Union pack" 1977). 
Although the Guild ultimately failed to bring the strike to a positive 
outcome it does not diminish the years of effort and the resilience of its 
campaign to raise wages for reporters on the Herald Examiner in line 
with other Southern California newspapers. During the decade~long 
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strike Guild members used a variety of promotional strategies to 
showcase their struggle. Their sustained efforts informed the public 
about the labor conflict and helped to influence adversely the Herald 
Examiner's circulation numbers and advertising revenue. Although the 
vast majority of the local and national newspaper coverage was pro~ 
management this stance had more to do with the newspapers' anti~ 
labor ideological position rather than any failing of the Guild to make 
its views heard. Certainly Editor & Publisher's coverage of the strike 
reinforced an anti~Guild position among editors and publishers that 
began in the 1930s when the American Newspaper Guild first turned 
to collective bargaining (Brennen 2004). 
H earst refused to negotiate with labor despite sustained pressure 
from community Leaders and the public to settle the strike. The con~ 
tinued losses of revenue and circulation were offset by his intention to 
destroy union involvement at the Los Angeles Herald Examiner. The 
same strategy used by Hearst and other corporations to hide profits 
from individual newspapers, by funneling income from one company 
within the corporation to another, was used to sustain the Herald 
Examiner during the decade~long strike. The assets of Hearst's multi~ 
million dollar media empire allowed the newspaper's continued losses 
to be diffused throughout the corporation, Hearst was thereby able to 
hold out for ten years until the existing unions had been decertified 
and rendered powerless. Hearst's refusal to negotiate with labor was 
repeated by other media conglomerates. Today union influence is at an 
all time low in the newspaper industry. 
As Hardt (1993, 90) suggests, the "anti~labor attitudes of media 
owners may offer explanations for the contemporary status and work~ 
ing habits of newsworkers, the production of content matter, and the 
understanding of audiences as consumers." At the time of the Herald 
Examiner strike, while many newspapers were anti~ labor, they also 
covered labor issues as a regular beat. Some newspapers, such as the 
Los Angeles Times, employed a labor editor. Today, even on daily urban 
newspapers, labor is no longer a regular area of coverage. McChesney 
describes labor reporting as "nearly extinct" (2004, 88). Linking the 
lack of labor coverage directly to the decline of the labor movement, 
McChesney notes, "People still work, poverty among workers is grow~ 
ing, workplace conflicts are as important as ever, but labor issues are 
no longer considered newsworthy because organized labor is no longer 
powerful" (2004, 76). Current labor coverage is routinely a historical, 
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fragmented, and superficial because it lacks background or under, 
standing of the role of labor. 
The relationship between the strike and the Guild's active and sus, 
rained opposition to monopolization also provides insights for future 
research into conglomeration and consolidation, central concerns of 
political economy. In the twenty,first century, the structure and con, 
trol of media conglomerates are central concerns of a global market 
economy. Ben Bagdikian notes that as of 2003, five media corpora, 
tions-Tiine Warner, Walt Disney Company, Murdoch's News Cor, 
poration, Viacom, and Bertelsmann-dominate mass communication 
in the United States. Linking media conglomeration to an increasingly 
limited flow of diverse information as well as to changes in public 
policy and political power, Bagdikian (2004, 29) suggests that politi-
cal leaders now "treat the country's most powerful media corporations 
with something approaching reverence:' Yet, for many policy makers, 
media monopolization is a new issue, because they do not understand 
chat media consolidation has been a concern throughout the twentieth 
century (Sterling 2000). At a time when the FCC is working to relax 
media ownership rules even further, understanding the efforts of the 
Newspaper Guild to alert Congress about the problems of monopoli, 
zation might aid critics and researchers trying to counter questionable 
FCC processes. 
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